GT: What message does your new book want to convey most? Satoshi: The world's growth engine is in Asia but this bonanza is limited. If we failed to take advantage of this period, the next growth engine may shift to Africa or other parts of the world.
We can see that countries outside the region are also joining in the battle for interests with Asia which makes the situation even more complicated. It will be extremely dangerous for both Japan and China, two Asian powers, to "hurt each other. Especially for Japan where growth is slowing, it is imperative to maximize economic growth during this windfall as it is related to Japan's future. GT: Does it take courage to publish this book under the current public opinion environment in Japan?
Satoshi: Of course. In Japan, anti-China rhetoric now dominates public opinion. China experts in Japan are facing headwinds. As we all know, Japan's media environment is dominated by business news, which means they are interested in "selling news". In other words, journalists write about what readers like to read. Negative stories about China, such as "China is wrong," are welcome and prevailing rhetoric. People who are good at marketing make easy money just by following the mainstream and "badmouth China".
But there is a risk that a future clash of feelings between Chinese and Japanese citizens could lead to a stalemate that would benefit no one. I hope that before the lose-lose situation happens, Japan will be reminded to come down to earth and avoid emotional reasoning. The Japanese always believe that it is necessary that everyone shares the same idea and are not very receptive to different views, which is rare in the international community.
In this case, my ideas may come under fire because in Japan "non-mainstream" is often considered wrong. Even so, I will continue to make my point. Since there is no good for Japan to "fight" with China, I must point out the possible consequences before Japan regrets it. Japan is accustomed to judging international issues in terms of right and wrong and is easy to fall into a huge trap.
Japanese diplomacy has failed because of this. In fact, it is difficult for the Japanese, who are used to think in black and white, to make a sober judgment when international relations change according to the evolution of interests and risks. What do you think about this? Will Japan choose sides between China and the US? Satoshi: Your observation is correct. Under pressure from the US, Japan's previously ambiguous stance was no longer allowed.
Facing such pressure, it is particularly important for Japan to make realistic choices. I also mentioned in the book that Japan should be cautious if it cannot confirm the allegations of "forced labor" and "genocide" made by the US. International relations can be regarded as "living creatures," and changes in diplomatic relations, particularly between major powers, are subject to gains and losses.
As long as interests are aligned, even what is unthinkable at this stage could be possible in the future. Maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific requires more than military means. Washington and Tokyo must broaden the discussion to the coordination of diplomacy and economic policy to nurture a more benign regional environment. Transforming the U. Recent trends in Japan present an opportunity to mobilize political support for a more activist security policy.
With the October election, the Social Democratic Party has shrunk to a minor political force, and the new Democratic Party led by young politicians born in the postwar era has emerged as a pivotal group. Unlike the pacifist Social Democrats, the Democrats are more willing to inject a healthy dose of realism into their dovish outlook. For example, in exchange for a reduction of U. With the demise of the old Social Democrats as an obstructionist force in defense policymaking, there is now an opportunity to develop a new security consensus.
For the United States, the critical challenge will be developing a strategic vision and a clearer sense of priorities. Its favorable geopolitical position coupled with pressing domestic problems will inevitably tug the United States toward a more modest foreign policy. What will be increasingly debated is not the question of international involvement as such, but the terms of that involvement.
Weaving these different goals into a coherent and integrated strategy is hard enough in the abstract. The task becomes virtually impossible without presidential leadership in defining priorities and mobilizing domestic political consensus, especially in Congress. Absent such leadership, policy will be ad hoc, inconsistent, and essentially reactive.
The time has come to strike a new strategic bargain between Japan and the United States. Under current arrangements, the alliance may not weather the test of a severe security crisis. The Persian Gulf crisis and war of provoked international criticism of Japan s limited role, wounded Japanese pride, and proved the inadequacy of checkbook diplomacy. Hesitation from Japan in another crisis could severely strain the alliance. When shared vital interests are at stake, Japanese financial contributions will be inadequate to convince Americans about the alliance s importance.
Preventing a rupture of the alliance during a crisis, therefore, requires altering the terms of the security relationship before such a crisis occurs. While the Pentagon has temporarily defused tensions on Okinawa, there is now widespread support in Japan for a gradual but significant reduction of the U. Rather than inflexibly sticking to the need for 47, U.
America s most important military assets in Japan are its air and naval power. In return, Japan should take steps to support U. If such a bargain can be struck, the Marine combat forces in Okinawa could be removed without impairing U.
Such a move would go far in consolidating Japanese political support for the alliance well into the next century. As the U. Although the two countries agreed to a prior consultations process when the bilateral security pact was signed, this mechanism has never been used.
Because support for U. A healthier alliance demands prior consultation. The U. The centrality of the U. While greater Japanese military support for U. Some Asian states might also interpret this move as the precursor to American military disengagement. Any attempt to restructure the alliance must therefore be sensitive to its possible impact on the rest of the region. And U. Finally, as critical as deterrence and crisis management are, they are by no means sufficient to promote regional security.
The United States and Japan must move beyond a strategy of military presence to develop an effective regional strategy to reduce tensions and prevent crisis. Keeping , troops in the East Asia-Pacific region is a poor surrogate for a comprehensive Asia policy.
More realism is necessary in claims about what this military presence accomplishes. What is desperately needed now is a concrete, coordinated policy to achieve these objectives. Last January, a high-level Chinese official visiting the United States aptly summarized Sino-American relations at the beginning of the second Clinton term. Practice, it seems, is paying off. The new approach is no less than the third distinct policy toward China adopted by the U. High-level contact with China was to be withheld until progress had been achieved.
By the end of , however, it had become increasingly evident that China was not succumbing to the American pressure on human rights and that other aspects of the relationship warranted attention.
The aim was to show that, on these other issues, the United States and China might find areas of cooperation and thus bring the overall relationship into better balance. The tensions in the Taiwan Strait persuaded the Clinton administration to adopt a fresh approach to China to reduce the chances of confrontation.
First, Washington explained that the purpose was not containment, as the Chinese feared, but rather the integration of China into the international community so that the rise of Chinese power could be absorbed in constructive ways. The Chinese government seems to have accepted the assurances that the United States does not seek to contain China and that it hopes to achieve a cooperative relationship. Thus, Chinese spokesmen have repeatedly said that the atmosphere for Sino-American relations has been significantly improved as a result of the new American initiative.
But the U. Moreover, several of these problems could well be exacerbated during the early months of the second Clinton term. Americans will pay close attention to the status of political rights and the integrity of the legal system in Hong Kong after it reverts to Chinese sovereignty on July 1.
Any restrictions on the freedoms of speech, press, or organization after July 1 could touch off a crisis in Sino-American relations, especially if the strictures involved the visible suppression of political protest.
And other sensitive issues could very likely flare up again in the months ahead. Actions by Taipei that are interpreted in China as moves toward independence could again provoke Beijing to bring military pressure to bear against Taiwan.
Evidence of Chinese exports of missile technology could trigger pressure to apply the economic sanctions required by U. And, finally, dramatic violations of human rights in China—especially the suppression of peaceful protests in a major Chinese city, a crackdown on ethnic separatists in Tibet or Xinjiang, or the harsh sentencing of political dissidents—could derail the plans for Sino-American summit meetings. Experts that hold this view tend to see Japanese leaders as alliance advocates. Key figures in this group hail from both ends of the U.
These experts, the author included, tend to push for a more equal and ambitious U. American experts who see Japanese counterparts as alliance advocates tend to believe that both allies are right to be concerned about China and that the threat from Beijing is likely to push Washington and Tokyo closer together. Echoing these views, the U. Although the alliance advocate school is the most common U. One alternative argument is that China seriously threatens Japan but that Japanese leaders do not appreciate the true level of the threat.
These experts see the debate in Tokyo as dominated by economic concerns about commercial profits rather than security.
In other words, they argue that Japan is continuing to freeride on the United States by ignoring the degree of threat that China and the Chinese Communist Party pose. But it almost seems to be going through the motions—hoping China is somehow frightened off or loses interest. Trump himself seems likely to fall within this group. Many in the American public wonder why U. While the primary view among Republicans is that Japanese policymakers tend to be alliance advocates, there is a growing contingent that sees Japan as a freeriding friend.
A third group of American experts hold that Japanese views are misaligned, but in the opposite direction. These views tend to be more popular within the academic and human rights communities, making them more prevalent among Democrats than among Republicans.
Although the belief that Japanese leaders are meddling militarists is not widely held within Washington, it is more frequent in some circles beyond the policymaking community. The Editorial Board of the New York Times , for example, has periodically published editorials and opinion pieces reflecting this view.
Finally, a fourth group of experts sees Japan and the United States as aligned on the threat emanating from China, but not in the way that alliance advocates believe. Instead, these scholars assess that the threat China poses to Japan is low, and they believe Japanese leaders see the threat this way themselves. This persistent pacifist view is not prevalent among either Republicans or Democrats, but like the meddling militarists viewpoint, it is more common among academics. David C.
What differentiates this group from those who think Tokyo is freeriding on the United States is that the persistent pacifist camp believes China does not pose a serious threat to Japan. Of the four viewpoints, this is possibly the one least frequently seen, particularly as views of China in both Japan and the United States have worsened in recent years. Yet this is not the only view. Republican and Democratic administrations alike typically have to contend with different sets of critics.
In the Democratic Party, critics of Japan often contend that the threat from China is overplayed by nationalist leaders in Tokyo, Washington, or both. In short, although a majority of experts from both parties tend to believe that Japanese policymakers are alliance advocates, a minority of Republicans view Japanese leaders as freeriding friends while a minority of Democrats perceive Japanese leaders as meddling militarists or persistent pacifists.
0コメント